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KEEPING PUBLIC MEDIATION PUBLIC:
EXPLORING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
CONFIDENTIAL MEDIATION AND
OPEN GOVERNMENT

A

Thomas S. Leatherbury*
Mark A. Cover**

fundamental tenet of democracy is the involvement of the citizenry

in government, involvement epitomized by the prototypical smalltown meeting.' Democratic government has grown from that of a
small town meeting into that of a nation of two hundred fifty million citizens. By necessity, many of the discussions and decisions involving the public interest have shifted from the town hall to vast complexes of offices,
departments, and bureaus, often beyond the direct purview of the citizens.
Because of this shift, the state and federal 2 governments passed open
records 3 and open meetings acts.4 The rationale in passing those acts is that
openness and involvement are as important to democracy today as they were
two hundred years ago. 5 Government still, as always, must be accountable
to the people. 6 As one commentator observed:
Ed. note: SMU LAW REVIEW invited Mssrs. Leatherbury and Cover to write this article as a
response to another article published in this issue. See Will Pryor and Robert M. O'Boyle,
Public Policy ADR: Confidentiality in Conflict? 46 SMU L. REV. 2207 (1993).
* Partner with Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.; B.A. 1976, J.D. 1979, Yale University. Mr.
Leatherbury currently serves as President of the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas
and represents a number of media interests.
** Associate with Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.; B.A. 1990, J.D. 1992, University of Texas at
Austin.
1. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 428, 428-29 (1991) [hereinafter Confidentiality]. "Like much of
this country's judicial process, the right of public access to court proceedings and records
derives from our English common law heritage. It exists to enhance popular trust in the fairness of the justice system, to promote public participation in the workings of government, and
to protect constitutional guarantees." Id.; see also Arthur R. Miller, Private Lives or Public
Access?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1991, at 65 [hereinafter Private Lives].
2. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1989).
3. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3B (Vernon Supp. 1993).
4. See id. art. 6252-17.
5. See Dianna Hunt, Closing the Door: Clout of Open Records in Texas Starts to Decline,
Hous. CHRON., Dec. 13, 1992, at IA. "'There continues to be a general desire on the part of
those who are in public office to maintain secrecy rather than openness,' says former Congresswoman Barbara Jordan, who helped draft the state [open records] law in 1973."; Id. " 'When
the public does not see what is going on, it becomes suspicious, and secrecy is anathema to the
citizen being enlightened and knowledgeable.' " Id. at 20A (quoting Barbara Jordon).
6. Id. at IA. "It's at the heart of the American and the Texas constitutions: Government is the servant, and not the master, of the people." Id.
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When linked, secrecy and political power are dangerous in the extreme. For all individuals, secrecy carries some risk of corruption and
or irrationality; if they. dispose of greater than ordinary power over
others, and if this power is exercised in secret, with no accountability to
7
those whom it affects, the initiation to abuse is great.
In fact, given the size and the complexity of government today, openness is
even more important than in the past because the decisions are easier to hide
and the public trust is easier to abuse."
Balanced against this fundamental policy of openness is the realization
that some matters have historically been confidential. 9 For example, the law
favors confidentiality in communications between attorney and client, in
trade secrets, and in some information of an intensely personal and private
nature. 10 Problems arise when legitimate reasons support both openness and
confidentiality. One such problem involves mediation of public policy disputes, in which the policy of open government clashes with the policy of
facilitating mediation through confidentiality.
Public policy mediation should not be confidential. Public policy disputes
are those which affect members of the public beyond the parties, and which
often involve one or more levels of government. "I Mediation is defined as "a
voluntary, informal (yet structured) process of dispute resolution wherein a
neutral party, the mediator, assists disputants to find a mutually acceptable
settlement of their dispute."' 1 2 Mediation has significant advantages both for
7. Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access to Public Courts: Discouraging
Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643, 651 n.33 (1991) (quoting SISSELA BOK,
SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION

106 (1982)).

8. See Under Seige: Texas' Open-Government Laws are being Eroded, Hous. CHRON.,
Dec. 20, 1992, at A23.
It is no secret that government likes to keep secrets. Government at every level.
It is in the political nature. Doing the public's business out of the public eye
avoids embarrassment, avoids having to put up with other people's opinions,
avoids accountability, and lessens the chance of revelation of wrongdoing.
Id.
9. Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange, 205 Cal. Rptr. 92,
102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that open records act "provisions evidence legislative
concern with 'two fundamental if somewhat competing societal concerns-prevention of secrecy in government and protection of individual privacy' ") (quoting Black Panther Party v.
Kehoe, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109 (Cal. 1974)); see also PrivateLives, supra note 1, at 66 ("Confidentiality is an integral part of the civil litigation process, and plays an essential role in fostering resolution of disputes from start to finish."); Confidentiality, supra note 1, at 464 ("Judicial
protection of various types of information to ensure that it is used solely for legitimate litigation purposes also protects the substantive rights of the parties.").
10. See Private Lives, supra note 1, at 66; Note, Trade Secrets in Discovery: From First
Amendment Disclosure to Fifth Amendment Protection, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1330, 1331 (1991)
(arguing that "in some cases, compelled public disclosure of trade secrets through the discovery process constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation");
Dianna Hunt, Future Looks Bleak for Public's Access to State Government, Hous. CHRON.,
Dec. 16, 1992 at Al, A16 (quoting Barbara Jordan for the statement that " '[t]here are times
when the privacy concerns do override the public's right to know' ").
11. Barbara McAdoo & Larry Bakken, Local Government Use of Mediationfor Resolution
ofPublic Disputes, 22 URB. LAW. 179, 179 n.1 (1990). "Public disputes are defined as 'controversies that affect members of the public beyond the primary negotiators. Public disputes
nearly always involve one or more levels of government, often as a party, and usually as a
decision maker.'" Id.
12. Id. at 184. "The mediator is not empowered to impose any decision on the parties, but
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the parties 13 and for the resolution of the underlying disputes, 14 and thus it
should be encouraged even in matters of public policy.' 5 Public policy mediation, however, should never be confidential.
This article responds to Will Pryor and Robert M. O'Boyle's article on
confidentiality in ADR. 16 Pryor contends that non-binding, public-policy
mediation should be confidential. This response argues, to the contrary, that
public-policy mediation should not be confidential. Part I examines the preliminary assertions of Pryor. Part II examines the conflict between confidential mediation and the Open Records Act. Part III examines the conflict
between confidential mediation and the Open Meetings Act. Part IV examines Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a as an example of openness in the
judicial system. Finally, the conclusion argues that openness is paramount
in a democratic government, and thus, when openness and ADR conflict,
the policy of openness is superior to that of furthering dispute resolution in
public policy disputes.
I.

PRELIMINARY ASSERTIONS EXAMINED

Pryor begins by correctly asserting that the public has lost confidence in
our civil justice system. 17 He then suggests three reforms which can improve the public attitude toward the system: first, mandatory pro bono; I8
second, amending the Rules of Evidence and Discovery to reduce complexity and expense; third, and "potentially most meaningful," the development
and availability of ADR. By ADR, Pryor means "non-binding mediation." 1 9 Based on this third suggestion, Pryor then makes several flawed
instead helps them to engage in constructive, progressive negotiations, in order to resolve disputes without litigation." Id. (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 193. "When a mediation process is successful, it is almost certain to attract
more residents to use mediation for future issues. They come to realize that the process encourages their thoughtful participation, and that it is a valid way to be involved in the public
decision-making process.". Id.
14. Id. at 188-89 (listing several advantages of mediation). First, "mediation allows the
interested parties themselves to ultimately craft solutions uniquely suited to the dispute at
hand." Id. at 188. Second, mediation "can include a distinct disputant 'education' component, in order to be certain that all parties are clear about the underlying problems that must
be resolved." Id. Third, "the mediation process thus ensures some continuity of communication, without which misconceptions and mistrust run rampant." Id. at 189. Fourth,
"[m]ediation provides interest groups with the opportunity to hear all the particulars of contrary positions and to offer, in a neutral setting, the possibility of questioning these contrary
positions. Therefore, trade-offs and exchanges between interested parties are more likely to
occur than in the usual, more adversarial, decision-making process." Id. Finally, "[miediation
encourages cooperation and promotes positive ongoing relationships." Id.
15. See id. at 183. "Modifications to accommodate a mediation process, prior to the formal public hearing process, could ensure greater citizen participation, an attempt to strive for
consensus-oriented decision, less adversarial hearings, and, in general, greater public support
for counsel decisions." Id.
16. Will Pryor & Robert O'Boyle, Public Policy: Confidentiality in Conflict?, 47 SMU L.
REV. 2207 (1993).
17. Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 16 at 2209.
18. Mandatory pro bono is a controversial subject beyond the scope of this article. See,
e.g., Jonathan Macey, Not All Pro Bono Work Helps the Poor, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1992, at
A7.
19. Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 16, at 2211.
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arguments.

First, Pryor incorrectly argues that confidential mediation will improve
public perception of the civil justice system. 20 The flaw in this argument is
that, if the public currently lacks confidence in our civil justice system, then
removing the dispute from public scrutiny exacerbates this lack of confidence by making the system even more bewildering and secretive to the nonparties. 21 Furthermore, although Pryor avoids constitutional challenge by
limiting his contemplation of public-policy ADR to non-binding mediation, 22 confidential non-binding mediation is inconsistent with a policy of
open government because, although the public agency need not accept the
mediator's resolution, if it does choose to accept it, the process of reaching
23
that resolution has been removed from public scrutiny.
Second, Pryor states that the overwhelming percentage of all lawsuits are
settled anonymously, and, given this anonymity, argues that "it seems a bit
disingenuous to criticize [a process] for producing the same or similar results
in a more timely, efficient, less stressful, and less expensive fashion on the
'24
grounds that the process [non-binding mediation] preserves anonymity."
There are two flaws with this argument. First, in Texas the proclivity to
settle actually supports a policy of openness because Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 76 presumes that all court records, including settlements involving government bodies, are open. 25 Second, anonymity of settlement cannot
apply to public policy disputes. 26 Public policy disputes by their very nature

20. Id. at 2210.
21. See Lloyd Doggett, Keeping Court Records in the Open, in TEXAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION HANDBOOK, 10-1, 10-7 (3d ed. 1992) (arguing that "justice faces its gravest threat
when courts dispense it secretly. Our system abhors star chamber proceedings with good reasons. Like a candle, court records hidden under a bushel make scant contribution to their
purpose."); Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 7, at 651 n.36. ("If there is a public perception
that cases can be sealed on the whim of a judge or at the insistence of a prominent individual or
powerful corporation, the public's confidence in the judicial decision-making process is
eroded.' "); id. at 644 ("Concealing information when its release would enhance government
accountability or avert danger to health and safety sacrifices the public interest and jeopardizes
confidence in the judicial system.") (quoting Letter from Texas Attorney General Jim Mattox
to Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court Tom Phillips, 1 (March 21, 1990)).
22. See, e.g., Dearborn Fire Fighters Union v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich.
1975).
23. See Acker v. Texas Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. 1990).
[The Scope of the Open Meetings Act] is consistent with the recommendation
of Woodrow Wilson that 'Government ought to be all outside and no inside.'
Our citizens are entitled to more than a result. They are entitled not only to
know what government decides but to observe how and why every decision is
reached. The explicit command of the statute is for openness at every stage of
the deliberations.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
24. Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 16, at 2212.
25. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 76(a) (presuming that all court records are open and requiring a
hearing and public policy determination for all confidential settlements); see also Doggett &
Muccheti, supra note 7, at 656 (noting that under Rule 76(a) the "trial judge is thus called
upon to balance the needs of the public against the asserted interest of the party seeking secrecy"). See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 76(a)).
26. Cf Confidentiality, supra note 1, at 477.
[T]he number of cases that conceivably could contain information that has any
bearing on public health or safety is minuscule compared to the corpus of litiga-
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are not anonymous, both because one of the parties is a government agency
and because the dispute involves a matter of public concern which affects
27
many individuals.
Third, Pryor argues that "[c]ritics of mediation inappropriately infer that
the public is, in some fashion, included in the process of dispute resolution
absent mediation" 28 when in fact most disputes are settled in private phone
calls, letters, and communications. Therefore, Pryor reasons, "[t]he public is
not included even when the subject of a dispute is public."'2 9 In effect, Pryor
is arguing that two wrongs make a right. Under a policy of openness, these
back-room discussions and negotiations are exactly the sort of activity prohibited if a quorum is involved. 30 Simply because these meetings occur, possibly in violation of the Open Meetings Act, 31 does not mean that they

should occur and does not justify additional confidentiality in mediation.
Fourth, Pryor argues that "[w]ith regard to cases not requiring judicial
review, mediation produces the same result as a case settled without mediation."'32 This argument ignores the fact that court proceedings are recorded
and that minutes are often kept in public meetings, either voluntarily or by
law. 33 In mediation, however, no record is required. Thus, the decision and
the process, which ordinarily would be recorded in the minutes and open to
public review, are hidden by confidential mediation.

Fifth, Pryor argues that "[p]arties to mediation of public policy disputes
traditionally recognize that any negotiated settlement is contingent upon judicial, legislative, or even public approval."' 34 The parties are not required to
condition settlement upon public approval, however. Thus, the parties could
decide on a course of action, keep it confidential, and remove it entirely from
tion in this country. Clearly, any argument based on these cases is a rather slim
reed for supporting a global and universal right of public access to all materials
produced in every docketed case.

Id.
27. See McAdoo & Bakken, supra note 11, at 179-81.
28. Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 16, at 2212.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Acker v. Texas Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1990); Hunt, supra
note 5, at 1 (noting that with the passage of open government statutes, "[g]one were the
smoke-filled rooms and closed-door policies that marked the earlier days of Texas government"). Acker, a primary case construing the Open Meetings Act, involved just such a backroom meeting. Acker requested a permit from the Water Commission and received a
favorable recommendation. The Commission recessed, however, and two of its three members
discussed his request in the restroom. Upon reconvening, the Commission voted to deny the
permit. Acker then filed suit under the Open Meetings Act, alleging that the restroom discussion violated the Act. The Court explained that the "executive and legislative decisions of our
governmental officials as well as the underlying reasoning must be discussed openly before the
public rather than secretly behind closed doors." Acker, 790 S.W.2d at 300.
31. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
32. Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 16, at 2212.
33. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 § 3B (Vernon & Supp. 1993). ("A governmental body shall prepare and retain minutes or make a tape recording of each of its open
meetings." Id.; cf Daily Gazette Co. v. Withrow, 350 S.E.2d 738, 746-47 (W. Va. 1986)
(stating that "[a] public official has a common law duty to create and maintain, for public
inspection and copying, a record of the terms of settlement of litigation brought against the
public official or his or her employee(s) in their official capacity.").
34. Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 16, at 2213.
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public review and accountability. Such a decision directly conflicts with the
statement of policy in the preamble of the Texas Open Records Act. 35 Nevertheless, Pryor argues that there is no accountability problem because
"[a]ccountability issues in a non-binding mediation discussion, however, do
not differ from other accountability issues regarding private service providers who participate in rendering public services (for example, child day
care). '' 36 This statement ignores the obvious and important difference, that
private service providers, such as child daycare, are not making public policy
determinations, determinations that could easily result from non-binding
mediation discussions.
Finally, Pryor makes the "two tiers" of justice argument: that the civil
justice system provides two tiers of justice, one for the wealthy and another
for the poor. 37 Therefore, he reasons, "[n]on-binding mediation, as an alternative to the continued litigation option, presents the best hope for the interests traditionally, and increasingly, excluded from just resolution of disputes
in our judicial system. '38 This statement may be true for the named parties,
but the public-at-large-both wealthy and poor-is excluded from confidential mediation, and the purpose of openness is to allow public participation
in and observation of the government decision-making process. In publicpolicy disputes, the public is always the real party in interest, even if not
39
explicitly recognized as such.
II.

THE OPEN RECORDS ACT

Although confidential public policy mediation does not explicitly violate
the Open Records Act, 4° it is nonetheless inconsistent with the policy of
openness underlying that Act. 41 Pryor argues that the Act does not apply to
35. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1993):
The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to
decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to

know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control
over the instruments they have created.

Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 16, at 2213.
Id. at 2213-14.
Id. at 2214.
Doggett & Muccheti, supra note 7, at 658.
When a private dispute is taken before a city council, a state regulatory board,
or into the halls of Congress, it is no longer purely private. The public finances
these legislative and executive institutions and has a fundamental right to know
how these matters are being resolved. This right is incorporated in open meetings, open records, and freedom of information acts.

Id.
40. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1993).

41. See id. § 1. "[I]t
is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Texas that
all persons are, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times entitled to full and
complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who
represent them as public officials and employees." Id.; Hunt, supra note 5, at IA (stating that
the "Texas Open Records Act was designed to give the force of law to the concept that government must conduct its business in the open"). Cf Doggett & Muccheti, supra note 7, at 651.
"Inspection of public records provides 'a check upon dishonest public officials, and will in
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the judiciary, and therefore, court-ordered mediation need not be open.4 2
Taking a myopic view of the Act, this argument is correct. 43 Court proceedings and court records are generally open, however, and confidential settlements require Rule 76a proceedings."4 Pryor notes that "[a]s a practical
matter, the mediator may choose not to maintain any records related to the
negotiations."' 45 Yet it is precisely because the mediator may choose not to
maintain any records that there is an openness problem. Even if the decision
is initially public, the process becomes private due to the absence of
46
records.
Although the general presumption of the Act is openness, 4 7 the legislature
created several exemptions from disclosure. 48 Each of these exemptions reflects a legislative determination that the benefits of confidentiality outweigh
those of openness. 49 For example, the Act exempts matters covered by the
attorney-client privilege.50 This exemption parallels the attorney-client evidentiary privilege and is thus consistent with the strong policy supporting
many respects conduce to the betterment of public service.' Guaranteeing greater access to
court records, including discovery records, serves this function." Id.
42. Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 16, at 2214-15.
43. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 2(l)(H) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (excluding
the judiciary).
44. See Private Lives, supra note 1, at 65. "Evidence admitted at trial generally is available to the public through the traditional common law right of access to the courtroom." Id.;
Doggett & Muccheti, supra note 7, at 647-48. "The United States Supreme Court has recognized a 'presumption-however gauged-in favor of public access to judicial records.'" Id.;
M.L. Stein, Will "rent-a-judges" Hold Secret Proceedings?, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 15,
1992, at 23 (noting that "both state law and the U.S. Supreme Court have declared that trial
proceedings be open unless there is an [sic] strong showing that they should be closed"); Dianna Hunt, Looking at the Record: Freedom of Information in Texas, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 13,
1992, at 21A (noting that, although the Open Records Act does not apply to the judiciary,
"the public is granted broad access to court records through common law and Constitutional
law. Generally, unless a court document has been specifically sealed by a judge, it is available
to the public."). But see Private Lives, supra note 1, at 65. "This right of access, however, is
not absolute; it never has extended beyond the confines of court proceedings and documents
themselves .... Further, there never has been any right of public access to the activities,
discussions and papers of the parties outside of the courtroom during discovery or settlement."
Id.
45. Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 16, at 2215.
46. North Carolina by statute requires the consideration of settlement terms before a public body to be entered into the minutes of that body. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.11 (a)(4)
(1990 & Supp. 1992); see also News & Observer Publishing v. Wake County Hosp., 284 S.E.2d
542, 549 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that the statute "requires a 'public body' to report its
consideration of settlement terms in executive session by entering the terms 'into its minutes
within a reasonable time after the settlement is concluded' ").
47. See Austin v. City of San Antonio, 630 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that the "legislative mandate of the [open records] act is strong
and clear. It requires that information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts
of those who serve the public to be freely available to all, 'unless otherwise expressly provided
by law.' ").

48. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3a (Vernon Supp. 1993) (listing
specific disclosure exemptions).
49. Cf PrivateLives, supra note 1,at 66 (noting that, although protective discovery orders
are exceptional, "their availability to provide confidentiality during discovery and settlement
serves objectives of the justice system as important as the attorney-client privilege work product doctrine, or the protection of trade secrets and privacy rights").
50. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (creating an
attorney-client privilege by incorporation of T.R.C.P. 167).
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it,51 but the privilege may not be used as a subterfuge to circumvent an open

records act.5 2 Another relevant exemption is for litigation records.5 3 Withholding information about litigation is discretionary, and this discretion has
led to abuse by making the litigation exemption the most commonly used
exemption in the Open Records Act.5 4 Despite the abuse, this exception is
consistent with the policy behind the attorney work product privilege. 55 The
policy is to avoid giving the opponent an unfair advantage through access to
the attorney's work product, trial strategy, and mental processes. 5 6 The
presentation of information about the case to opponents and the actual resolution of the dispute, however, are not privileged and thus also should not be
57
confidential in government mediation.
The best examples of the clash between ADR confidentiality and open
58
records acts involve attempts to make public policy settlements secret.
51. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 242-43 (1986).
52. See Librach v. Cooper, 778 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a
settlement agreement made during a closed meeting of the school board did not fall within the
attorney-client communication exception to the state Open Records Acts merely because an
attorney was present). The court explained that the parties
do not seek any settlement proposals or negotiations discussed prior to the final
Agreement, nor do they seek the records or minutes relating or pertaining to
those possible communications and deliberations ....
However, to prohibit the
disclosure of the final contract here merely because an attorney was consulted by
the Board causes the exception to engulf the Act's disclosure provisions.
Id.
53. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
54. See Hunt, supra note 5, at 1. "One of the most commonly used exemptions to the
Open Records Act, the litigation exception allows agencies to withhold information related to
pending or anticipated legal action, including disciplinary proceedings." Id. Hunt explained
that
[i]n years past, the government agency had to show that the information could
interfere with its legal strategy in a case before being allowed to withhold the
information. In 1990, however, the Attorney General's office abandoned that
requirement and concluded that information that related to pending or expected
litigation could be withheld. Since then, the amount of information closed to
the public because of the litigation exception has soared.

Id.
55. See Hunt, supra note 45, at 21A (explaining that the litigation exemption "is designed
to prevent the use of the Open Records Act to circumvent the legal system's discovery
procedures").
56. See WOLFRAM, supra note 51, at 292-96 (discussing the work product privilege).
57. See id. at 268-71.
58. See, e.g., State ex reL Sun Newspapers v. Westlake Bd. of Educ., 601 N.E.2d 173, 175
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (issuing mandamus to release a confidential settlement agreement between the school board and a former administrator because " '[a] public entity cannot enter
into enforceable promises of confidentiality with respect to public records.' ") (quoting State ex
rel. Dwyer v. Middletown, 557 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)); Dutton v. Guste, 395 So. 2d
683, 685 (La. 1981) (concluding that settlement documents between the state and architects for
the Superdome were public and must be made available under the state's open records statute.); cf Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. University of Maine, 555 A.2d 470, 472-73 (Me. 1989)
(holding that the rule making evidence relating to settlements inadmissible does not protect
that evidence from public disclosure).
The inadmissibility in evidence of settlement agreements has as its policy objective the encouragement of out-of-court disposition of disputes by the parties
themselves. That objective is in no way compromised by our holding that the
public has a right to know the terms upon which a public employer has settled
with a resigning contract employee.
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These examples demonstrate that if ADR confidentiality is allowed under an
open records act, the possibilities swallow the rule of openness. For example, merely by sending a public policy dispute to mediation, the parties could
make confidential that process which otherwise would be of record; and by
making the settlement itself confidential, the parties could also hide the
decision.
In Anchorage School Districtv. Anchorage Daily News, 59 the court resolved
a conflict between the Alaska Open Records Act and a confidential settlement agreement involving the local school district and an asbestos contractor. The court stated that:
We recognize the important public policy served by those measures
which encourage settlement. We recognize also that some litigants are
unwilling to settle unless the terms of settlement remain confidential,
and that a municipality's inability to assure confidentiality may, therefore, adversely affect its ability to negotiate a settlement. Nevertheless,
the specific statutory provisions upon which the Daily News relies reflect a policy determinationfavoring disclosure ofpublic records over the
generalpolicy of encouragingsettlement.6°
The court then held that "a public agency may not circumvent the statutory
disclosure requirements by agreeing to keep the terms of a settlement agree61
ment confidential."
In Daily Gazette Co. v. Withrow62 the court addressed a challenge under
the West Virginia Open Records Act to the confidentiality of a settlement
agreement between the local sheriff and a former employee. The court found
that the settlement agreement was a public record 6 3 and then explained that
two interests mandated settlement disclosure:
(1) the public's right to know whether a public official or a public employee has been charged with official misconduct (and whether such
charges have been tacitly admitted) and (2) the financial impact upon
the public of a litigation settlement which is paid either with public
funds or with insurance proceeds generated by publicly financed insurance premiums. 64
The court implied that another reason for disclosure in a public interest case
Id. (citation omitted); see also Confidentiality, supra note 1,at 464. "[P]ublic access may be
important when one of the settling litigants is a governmental agency, public entity, or offi-

cial." Id.; but see Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 7, at 659 n.75 (noting that secrecy provisions in settlement agreements have been given effect under the Open Records Act, but citing
only Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. ORD-415 (1984)).
59. 779 P.2d 1191, 1191-92 (Alaska 1989).

60. Id. at 1193 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
61. Id. (summarily applying the same reasoning to the Open Meetings Act). "The purpose of the open meetings act is to assure that government units transact business openly. ...
The open meetings requirement is intended to further the same purpose as the public records
disclosure statutes, not to decimate it." Id. at 1193 n.5.
62. 350 S.E.2d 738 (W. Va. 1986).

63. Id. at 743. "It is clear that a release or other litigation settlement document in which
one of the parties is a public body, involving an act or omission of the public body in the public
body's official capacity, is a 'public record' within the meaning of a freedom of information
statute." Id.
64. Id.
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is that "'the activities complained about are by their very nature newsworthy. It is particularly in matters such as these that freedom of communication should be kept open and that none of the real issues or facts become
obscured.' "65 The court then held the settlement confidentiality provision
66
void.
In Register Division ofFreedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange67 the
court rejected the argument that allowing public access to settlements in-

volving government would expose government to baseless lawsuits. The
court explained that,
[a]gainst this interest must be measured the public interest in finding
out how decisions to spend public funds are formulated and in insuring
governmental processes remain open and subject to public scrutiny. We
find these considerations clearly outweigh any public interest served by

conducting settlement of tort claims in secret, especially in 68
light of the
policies of disclosure and openness in governmental affairs.
Also in the context of confidential public policy settlements, a frequent
argument supporting confidential settlements is that removing confidentiality will "chill" future settlements. 69 When a court faces this argument, it
directly confronts the conflict between the policy of open government and
the policy of dispute settlement. As argued in this article, openness triumphs. For example, in Des Moines Independent Community School District
Public Records v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. 70 the court addressed

the confidentiality of a settlement agreement between the school district and
a fired administrator. After noting that other "[c]ourts have generally held
that settlement agreements with public bodies are subject to disclosure," 7'

the court rejected the possible chilling effect on future settlements and held
that the state legislature had not demonstrated an intent to keep such settle65. Id. (quoting Miami Herald Publishing v. Collazo, 329 So. 2d 333, 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1976)).
66. Id. at 746. The court explained that:
The courts refuse to enforce a provision in a litigation settlement agreement
prohibiting disclosure of the terms of the agreement where such a provision is
contrary to the freedom of information statute. Assurances of confidentiality do
not justify withholding public information from the public; such assurances by
their own force do not transform a public record into a private record for the
purpose of the State's Freedom of Information Act... "[T]o allow the government to make documents exempt by the simple means of promising confidentiality would subvert FOIA's disclosure mandate."
Id. (quoting Washington Post Co. v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 690 F.2d
252, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
67. 205 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
68. Id. "[O]pening up the County's settlement process to public scrutiny will, nevertheless, put prospective claimants on notice that only meritorious claims will ultimately be settled
with public funds. This in turn will strengthen public confidence in the ability of governmental
entities to efficiently administer the public purse." Id. Limiting its "holding to the actual
discussions and actions of the claims settlement committee," the court explained that the holding did not mean that "every discussion regarding settlement of an action or potential case
against the county should be made public." Id. at 102 n. 13.
69. See, e.g., Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex. App.Dallas 1986) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987).
70. 487 N.W.2d 666 (Iowa 1992).
71. Id. at 669.

1993]

CONFIDENTIAL MEDIATION

2231

ments confidential. 72 In Denver Publishing Co. v. University of Colorado7 3
the court also rejected the chilling effect on settlements argument. The court
recognized that "such an effect is possible, [but] the public's right to know
how public funds are expended is paramount considering the public policy of
'74
the Open Records Act."
The chilling effect on settlements argument has not been universally rejected, however. 7" For example, the Administrative Conference of the
United States decided that:
The Conference, of course, recognizes the principle that decisions affecting the public welfare ought to be made in the open and subject to
public and judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, since settlements are essential to administrative agencies, a careful balance must be struck between
the openness required for the legitimacy of many agency agreements
and the confidentiality
that is critical if sensitive negotiations are to
76
yield agreements.
The Conference explained that "[c]onfidentiality assures the parties that
what is said in the discussions will be limited to the negotiations alone so
they can be free to be forthcoming."' 77 Therefore, the Conference proposed
in its Model Rule that:
[P]ublic policy favoring voluntary resolution of disputes therefore requires that the [mediator] not reveal, either voluntarily or through legal
compulsion, information learned in confidence during the negotiations.
To encourage the parties to negotiate, this rule enunciates an agency
policy seeking to protect 78the confidentiality of settlement negotiations
involving the [mediator].
III. THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT
Like the Open Records Act, the Open Meetings Act 79 reflects a policy of
openness in government but does not extend to the judiciary, perhaps because judicial proceedings are of record and the courtroom is generally
open.8 0 Nevertheless, the Open Meetings Act is relevant because it applies
to the executive and legislative branches,8 1 which are usually parties to pub72. Id. The court also noted that a new statute, inapplicable to this case because of retroactivity problems, "requires that, whenever there has been a settlement of a claim against a
governmental body (or its employee) by its insurer, a written summary of the settlement terms
must be filed with the governmental body and made public." Id. at 669-70 n.3.
73. 812 P.2d 682, 685 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).

74. Id. The court held, however, that release was limited to the final settlement and thus
an earlier proposed settlement was excluded. Id.
75. See also, Private Lives, supra note 1,at 66 (arguing that "the settlement process would
be impaired if the parties could not rely on the assurance of confidentiality reached voluntarily
in the settlement agreement. In fact, the greater incentive to litigate, simply to postpone or
avoid public access to confidential information, would work to the disadvantage of poorer
litigants.").
76. 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-11 (1992).
77. Id.
78. 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-11 app. (1992).
79. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
80. See supra notes 40-77 and accompanying text.
81. See Cox Enter. v. Board of Trustees, 706 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tex. 1986) (stating that the
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lic-issue disputes.8 2 A current example of openness under the Act in all
three branches of government is television. Meetings of governmental bodies
may be videotaped, providing a record of what the individual officials say
and how they vote.8 3 And in the courtroom, new rules allow cameras under
84
certain circumstances, thereby fostering even greater public involvement.
The problem with ADR is that the Open Meetings Act requires any deliberation involving a quorum of a governmental body to be open to the public

unless expressly exempted under the Act.8 5 The Act does not expressly authorize closed sessions for ADR, and so absent amendment, governmental
mediation must be open. 86 One commentator has succinctly noted the prob-

lem, explaining that:
Mediation works around confidentiality. Under the Texas ADR Procedures Act, participants in ADR proceedings are promised strict confidentiality, which puts ADR procedures at odds with the TOMA.
Unless the TOMA is amended, a governmental body would not be able
to legally respect this confidentiality. In fact, the whole idea of the resolution of public disputes by a state agency's use 87of ADR procedures
runs contrary to the policies of open government.

Open Meetings Act "is intended to safeguard the public's interest in knowing the workings of
its governmental bodies."); accord Ferris v. Texas Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 808 S.W.2d
514, 516 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied) (citing Cox and stating that the
legislature's purpose in passing the Act was to ensure that every regular, special,
or called meeting or session of every governmental body, with certain limited
exceptions, would be open to the public. As originally conceived, the Act was
designed to ensure that the public has the opportunity to be informed concerning the transactions of public business.
(Citation omitted)).
82. See McAdoo & Bakken, supra note 11, at 179 n. 1 (stating that almost all public disputes involve at least one governmental unit as a party).
83. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 § 2(i) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
84. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 18c; TEX. R. App. P. 21; see, e.g., Thomas S. Leatherbury, Cameras in the Courtroom, in TEXAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION HANDBOOK 12-1, 12-8 to 12-15
(3d ed. 1992) (containing the local rules for cameras in the courtroom in Dallas and Travis
counties); see generally id. at 12-1 (explaining the development of the law allowing cameras in
the courtroom). For example, the School Finance case was one of the first to be televised from
the Texas Supreme Court. Id.
85. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993). One commentator, however, argues that there is no problem.
The specific provisions of APTRA relating to the specific act of resolving a contested case must obviously be construed as an exception to the general provisions of TOMA applicable to all governmental bodies. This construction
preserves the integrity of both statutes and the exception to TOMA does not
frustrate its goals due to APTRA's requirement that agency officials set forth
meticulous findings of fact and conclusions of law that must be supported by the
formal record.
Ronald L. Beal, The Clash of the Open Meetings Act and APTRA: A Tragedy In the Making, 55
TEX. B.J. 928, 929 (1992).
86. See Jennifer S. Riggs, Alternate Dispute Resolution & Other Informal Settlement Techniques in Agency Proceedings, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS PDP ADVANCED ADMINISTRATION
LAW COURSE, D-1, D-3 (1991).
87. Id. at D-3; see also Brian D. Shannon, The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act and ADR: A New Twist for Administrative Procedure in Texas?, 42 BAYLOR L. REV.
705, 733 (1990).
[T]here is a natural tension between open government concerns and maintaining
the confidentiality of ADR processes.... [T]he Act would not literally apply to
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As with the Open Records Act, the exceptions to the Open Meetings Act
involve legislative determinations that the proceedings should be confidential. Pryor contemplates that public policy mediation "includes a ratification
process by the appropriate executive or judicial authority. 8 8 This contemplation falls short, however, because, although the decision may be ratified,

the process of reaching the decision was secret. Furthermore, the contemplation of review assumes that the parties will in fact do so. Instead of so
assuming, why not require review? If the parties will do so anyway, nothing
is lost.

IV.

RULE 76A

The policy of openness in government recently spread to civil procedure
with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76(a). Rule 76(a) presumes that court
records are open 89 and is based on the same rationale as the Open Records
and Open Meetings Acts. 90 Under the rule, court records may only be

sealed if there is "a specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly
outweighs: (1) this presumption of openness; [and] (2) any probable adverse
effect that sealing will have upon public health or safety," 9 1 and if no less
restrictive means than sealing will protect the interest. 92 As relevant here,
"court records" include all documents filed in a civil case, "settlement agreements not filed of record ... that seek to restrict disclosure of information
concerning ... the administration of public office, or the operation of gov-

ernment,"' 93 and non-filed discovery concerning "the administration of pub'94
lic office, or the operation of government."

Several powerful justifications support the rule.95 For example, "greater
ADR procedures unless they were conducted before a quorum of the governing
body of an agency, an unlikely scenario. On the other hand, the resolution of
largely public disputes through an agency's use of ADR procedures may run
counter to policies of open government.

Id.
88. Pryor & O'Boyle, supra note 16, at 2218-19.
89. See Doggett, supra note 21, at 10-3. "Rule 76(a) begins by affirming the clear presumption that all civil court records are open to the public." Id.
90. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 7, at 654 "[I]t
is recognized that openness of the
legislative process helps ... outweigh the possible loss of expediency created by public access.
Rule 76(a) and the revised Rule 166b(5)(c) represent a realization that similar interests are at
stake in litigation .... [Siecrecy, not openness, is the exception that requires justification." Id.
91. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76(a)(1).
92. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(l).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 76a(2); see also Doggett, supra note 21, at 10-4.
[T]he term 'court records' is expanded to include settlement agreements not filed
of record, which seek to circumvent the rule by including provisions restricting
'disclosure of information concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect
upon the general public health or safety or the administrationof government or
the operation of government.
Id. (emphasis added).
95. Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 7, at 648. "Several concerns motivated those who
drafted and adopted Rule 76(a)." Id. Furthermore, the rule is not without its vocal critics.
See Note, supra note 10, at 1345 (calling Rule 76(a) a "poor model for other states"); Confidentiality, supra note 1, at 501 (cautioning against "rush[ing] sheeplike down the path chosen
by Texas" in adopting Rule 76(a)).
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access to civil judicial records promotes public health and safety,"'96 "access
to judicial records encourages greater integrity from attorneys and their clients," 97 and "access ensures greater integrity from the bench. An old adage
tells us that 'doctors bury their mistakes, but judges publish theirs.' "98 "Finally, and most importantly, greater access strengthens democracy." 99 As
incorporated in the rule, these justifications affirm the presumption that all
civil court records are open, and, with this presumption in mind, the judge
then balances the needs of the public with the asserted need for secrecy. 1°
V. CONCLUSION
When confidentiality and open government collide in public policy mediation, confidentiality must lose. Mediation can play an important part in the
resolution of public disputes, but it should not be confidential because the
policy of furthering the efficient resolution of disputes pales in comparison
with the fundamental policy of openness in a representative government. In
an age when government paradoxically invades every facet of our lives because of its size, yet also because of that size avoids accountability, a policy
of openness is crucial to monitor abuse of the public trust and to ensure
responsibility to the people. As its name suggests, public policy mediation
must always remain public under this policy of openness.

96. Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 7, at 648.
97. Id. at 650.
98. Id. at 650-51.
99. Id. at 652.
100. Doggett, supra note 21, at 10-13 "The trial judge is thus called upon to balance the
needs of the public with the asserted interest of the party seeking secrecy." Id.

